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1	 http://www.tportal.
hr/vijesti/hrvat-
ska/94833/Kosorici-
na-vlada-nepopular-
nija-od-Sanaderove.
html
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Croatia: accession negotiations with the EU 
overshadowed by parliamentary elections
Marta Szpala
In 2011 Croatia entered the final stage of its accession negotiations with 
the EU. The completion of these negotiations will probably coincide with 
the parliamentary elections which should be held in November or December 
this year. The elections are likely to bring about a change of government, 
as public support for Jadranka Kosor's cabinet and her party, the Croatian 
Democratic Union (HDZ) has been declining; the left-wing opposition is 
likely to take power. Therefore, the government’s main goal is to complete 
the accession negotiations in the first half of the year, in order to sign the 
accession treaty and hold the EU membership referendum before the par-
liamentary elections. The HDZ believes that only the successful completion 
of the accession negotiations could increase its chances of a good result in 
the upcoming elections. At the same time, fearing a further fall in support, 
the government will avoid any decisions and reforms that would be contro-
versial for the public, especially in the sphere of the economy; such deci-
sions could also increase Euroscepticism among the Croatian public, and 
result in the rejection of EU accession in the referendum. The government 
in Zagreb hopes that the currently implemented anti-corruption strategy 
and reform of the judiciary, as well as the advanced process of adaptation 
to EU conditions, will be enough to complete the negotiations. This strat-
egy has a serious chance of success, considering that there is considerable 
support for Croatia's membership among the EU countries and institutions. 
Another reason is that further prolongation of the negotiations could ag-
gravate hostility towards the EU among the Croatian public, and would be 
a bad sign for other Balkan states with membership aspirations. However, 
subordinating Croatian policies to the completion of negotiations in the first 
half of the year could prove to be adverse for Croatia itself in the longer 
term, as it would put off the necessary structural reforms.
Internal factors
Jadranka	Kosor's	cabinet	enjoys	modest	public	support	(about	24.1%1)	because	of	the	per-
sistently	bad	economic	situation	and	serious	corruption	allegations	against	members	of	the	
HDZ,	the	ruling	coalition’s	main	party.	Moreover,	the	government	is	weakened	by	internal	
conflicts	within	the	HDZ.	Due	to	its	weak	position,	the	government	has	limited	capacity	to	
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2	 In	2009,	the	value	of	foreign	di-
rect	investments	fell	by	55.2%	
compared	to	2008,	and	totalled	
€1.87	billion;	
http://daily.tportal.hr/63031/
FDI-in-Croatia-reduced-	
by-55-2-to-EUR-1-87-billion-
in-2009.html
	
	
3	 According	to	the	Gallup	Balkan	
Monitor	survey	conducted	
in	June/July	2010,	89%	
of	respondents	consider	
the	government	to	be	corrupt.	
Gallup	Balkan	Monitor.	
‘Insights	and	Perceptions:	
Voices	of	the	Balkans’;	
www.balkan-monitor.eu
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implement	 radical	 reforms;	moreover,	 the	opposition	 is	seeking	to	undermine	the	demo-
cratic	legitimacy	of	the	cabinet	and	to	hold	early	elections.
The	main	factor	undermining	support	for	Kosor's	cabinet	is	the	bad	economic	situation	and	
Croatia's	slow	recovery	from	recession.	So	far,	the	government	has	pursued	a	conservative	
policy	and	avoided	taking	radical	economic	reforms	in	the	face	of	the	global	economic	crisis.	
The	cabinet	assumed	that	the	situation	on	global	markets	would	get	better	soon,	which	was	
supposed	to	return	Croatia	to	the	path	of	economic	growth.	This	strategy	has	proved	to	
be	ineffective.	On	the	contrary,	Croatia	is	currently	one	of	the	region’s	few	countries	which	
has	noted	a	renewed	decline	in	GDP	in	2010	(it	fell	by	5.8%	in	2009,	and	1.5%	in	2010).	
This	has	also	triggered	a	significant	rise	in	unemployment,	from	9.7%	in	2009	to	18.2%	
in	December	2010.
Neither	has	the	Croatian	government	taken	any	steps	to	consolidate	public	finance,	such	as	
reducing	the	extremely	high	expenditure	on	the	extensive	state	sector,	or	introducing	reforms	
to	the	health	care	and	welfare	benefits	system.	To	decrease	the	budget	deficit,	the	govern-
ment	has	confined	itself	to	increasing	VAT	and	introducing	the	so-called	crisis	tax	on	per-
sonal	income	(under	public	pressure	it	soon	withdrew	from	the	latter	decision).	This	did	not	
significantly	improve	the	budget	balance,	and	was	followed	by	Standard	and	Poor	lowering	
Croatia's	credit	rating	to	BBB-	level	in	December	2010.	Other	problems	that	make	it	more	
difficult	 to	overcome	 the	economic	crisis	
are	 the	unfavourable	 investment	climate,	
numerous	 barriers	 to	 doing	 business,	
and	sizeable	para-fiscal	charges	for	entre-
preneurs.	These	factors	have	accelerated	
the	decline	 in	 foreign	 investments	during	
the	crisis2,	and	are	currently	discouraging	
new	investors.
The	government's	position	is	also	affected	
by	the	anti-corruption	campaign	initiated	in	2009	under	pressure	from	the	EU,	which	re-
sulted	in	the	arrests	of	many	HDZ	members	in	late	2010,	including	Ivo	Sanader,	the	long-
standing	chairman	of	the	party	and	Prime	Minister	in	2003-2009,	the	ministers	of	economy	
and	defence	in	his	government,	and	the	party’s	treasurer.	Also,	arrests	were	made	among	
people	linked	to	the	party	who	had	sat	on	supervisory	boards	and	the	boards	of	directors	
of	major	state-owned	companies.	This	has	shaken	public	support	for	the	government,	which	
is	widely	regarded	as	corrupt3.	
The	numerous	arrests	are	supposed	to	demonstrate	that	the	government	is	fighting	corrup-
tion	at	the	highest	level.	It	cannot	be	ruled	out	that	the	ongoing	investigation	and	testimony	
by	the	former	Prime	Minister	will	result	in	extending	the	circle	of	suspects	to	other	members	
of	 the	government.	These	actions	may	even	shake	 the	position	of	Prime	Minister	Kosor,	
who	was	a	close	associate	of	Sanader	and	a	minister	in	his	cabinet	for	years.	On	the	other	
hand,	there	are	suppositions	that	the	campaign	carried	out	by	Prime	Minister	Kosor	is	an	
instrument	of	political	struggle,	aimed	at	eliminating	people	associated	with	the	former	PM	
from	the	HDZ	and	the	government,	and	as	a	result,	at	strengthening	her	control	over	the	
party.	Apart	from	a	few	cases,	the	spectacular	arrests	have	not	led	to	specific	people	being	
charged.	Moreover,	no	investigations	have	been	initiated	against	certain	other	members	of	
the	government	whom	the	media	accuse	of	corruption.	This	gives	rise	to	doubts	whether	
the	government	is	determined	enough	to	break	the	ties	of	corruption,	or	whether	it	is	only	
simulating	such	activity	 in	order	 to	eliminate	 its	political	adversaries,	while	at	 the	same	
convincing	the	EU	that	Croatia	is	making	active	efforts	to	fight	corruption.
Jadranka Kosor's cabinet enjoys 
modest public support because 
of the persistently bad economic situa-
tion and serious corruption allegations 
against members of the HDZ, 
the ruling coalition’s main party. 
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The	government’s	 failures	and	mistakes	are	being	efficiently	exploited	and	publicised	by	
the	opposition,	who	themselves	are	being	supported	by	President	Ivo	Josipović,	the	most	
popular	politician	 in	Croatia.	For	over	a	year,	 the	opposition	parties	have	demanded	 the	
resignation	of	the	government	and	early	elections.	So	far	these	demands	have	been	merely	
a	political	game,	as	taking	power	would	oblige	them	to	confront	the	bad	economic	situation	
and	the	problems	in	the	accession	negotiations.	However,	if	–	as	the	government	expects	
–	the	recovery	of	the	global	economy	improves	the	economic	situation	in	Croatia	and	the	
accession	negotiations	head	for	rapid	completion,	the	opposition	will	make	intensive	efforts	
to	remove	the	government	and	hold	early	elections.	The	coalition	of	left-wing	parties,	led	
by	Zoran	Milanović,	currently	includes	the	Social	Democratic	Party,	the	Istrian	Democratic	
Assembly,	the	Croatian	People's	Party,	and	the	Croatian	Party	of	Pensioners.	At	the	mo-
ment	it	enjoys	the	support	of	43.7%	of	voters,	while	support	for	the	ruling	coalition	is	cur-
rently	standing	at	27.8%.	However,	the	left-wing	coalition	is	afraid	that	the	ruling	party	may	
take	advantage	of	the	successful	completion	of	the	negotiations	and	the	improvement	of	
the	economic	situation.	They	would	 thus	
prefer	 the	government	 to	collapse	before	
its	 term	 is	 out.	 It	 can	 be	 expected	 that	
the	 opposition	will	 publicise	 all	 the	 gov-
ernment’s	 failures	 and	 the	 corruption	 al-
legations	against	its	members.
Considering	the	escalating	criticism	of	the	
government	and	its	falling	popular	support,	
Prime	Minister	 Kosor	 decided	 to	 reshuf-
fle	 her	 government	 in	 December	 2010.	
The	ministers	of	finance	and	construction	
were	dismissed	and	a	Ministry	for	Invest-
ments	was	created.	These	decisions	were	supposed	to	improve	the	government's	image,	
while	the	nomination	of	professionals	respected	in	the	business	community	to	ministerial	
posts	associated	with	the	economy	was	intended	to	demonstrate	that	the	government	is	
determined	to	overcome	the	consequences	of	the	crisis.	However,	these	actions	have	not	
yielded	the	expected	results,	and	the	cabinet's	economic	policy	is	still	receiving	criticism	
from	the	public.
No	 radical	 change	 in	 the	 government's	 economic	policy	 should	be	 expected	 in	 the	pre-	
-election	period.	Measures	to	reduce	spending	have	met	with	resistance	from	the	general	
public,	as	 they	 require	a	 reduction	 in	employment	 in	 the	state	sector	and	cuts	 to	social	
benefits.	These	moves	may	spark	off	strikes	and	protests	by	influential	trade	unions	and	
war	veterans’	associations.	The	tense	situation	in	public	finance	also	calls	the	reforms	de-
manded	by	the	EU	into	question,	as	they	require	substantial	financial	outlays	at	the	initial	
stage.	After	Croatia's	financial	ratings	were	lowered,	the	cost	of	servicing	the	country’s	for-
eign	debt	rose	significantly,	which	poses	a	threat	to	budget	stability	in	the	coming	months	
(in	March	2011	Croatia	has	to	refinance	bonds	worth	€750	million).	Continuing	the	current	
economic	policy	may	undermine	Croatia's	competitiveness	in	the	long	run,	and	significantly	
impede	its	return	to	the	path	of	economic	growth.
Holding	 early	 elections	 at	 this	 time	 could	 prove	 to	 be	 more	 advantageous	 for	 Croatia	
in	the	long	run.	A	new	government	with	strong	electoral	legitimacy	would	be	much	more	
determined	to	implement	reforms.	This	would	allow	for	a	more	dynamic	modernisation	and	
transformation	of	the	economy	and	state	institutions,	and	ultimately,	better	preparation	for	
EU	membership.
The government’s failures and mistakes 
are being efficiently exploited by the 
left-wing opposition, which is currently 
supported by 43.7% of voters. 
However, the left-wing parties are con-
cerned that the ruling party will take 
advantage of the success related to 
the completion of negotiations and the 
improvement of the economic situation.
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4	 According	to	the	survey	con-
ducted	in	spring	2010,	only	
38%	of	the	public	thought	
that	EU	membership	would	
be	beneficial	for	Croatia,	and	
45%	thought	otherwise.	Only	
26%	of	respondents	favoured	
membership	in	the	EU,	while	
31%	were	against	the	idea.	
Data	provided	by	Eurobarom-
eter,	spring	2010.
5	 Niti	polovica	hrvatskih	
građana/ki	nije	sigurna	želi	li	
ulazak	u	EU,	
http://www.promocija-plus.
com/javno_mnijenje/index_
javno_mnijenje.htm
6	 The	result	of	the	referendum	is	
binding,	regardless	of	turnout.	
The	constitution	of	the	Repub-
lic	of	Croatia,	article	86.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
7	 	Support	for	the	accession	to	
the	EU	has	little	to	do	with	
people's	political	and	partisan	
preferences.	The	levels	of	sup-
port	among	the	electorate	of	
two	major	parties	–	the	HDZ	
and	the	SDP	–	are	similar,	
at	63%	and	57.5%	respec-
tively.	Niti	polovica	hrvatskih	
građana/ki	nije	sigurna	želi	li	
ulazak	u	EU,	op.cit.
The uncertain outcome of the membership referendum
While	implementing	reforms,	the	government	must	also	consider	the	extent	of	public	sup-
port	for	the	accession,	and	the	high	level	of	Euroscepticism	among	its	citizens.	Even	though	
all	important	political	groups	and	elites	favour	Croatia's	membership	in	the	EU,	public	opin-
ion	polls	show	that	a	considerable	part	of	society	has	long	been	opposed	to	their	country's	
membership	in	the	EU4.	According	to	a	survey	conducted	in	February	2011,	less	than	half	
of	the	Croatian	public	favour	EU	membership	(49.4%,	a	drop	of	3.7%	since	June	2010),	
while	40.3%	of	respondents	opposed	membership5.	The	outcome	of	the	membership	ref-
erendum	that	should	be	held	within	30	days	of	signing	 the	Accession	Treaty	 is	 thus	 far	
from	certain6.	The	government	hopes	that	a	widespread	information	campaign	promoting	
EU	membership	will	increase	public	support	for	accession;	the	government	will	also	avoid	
implementing	controversial	reforms	that	could	reduce	this	support	further.	
The	main	reasons	for	such	low	public	support	for	EU	membership	are	the	negative	assess-
ment	of	the	conditions	offered,	and	scepticism	about	the	potential	benefits	that	accession	
to	the	EU	would	bring	Croatia.	Public	opinion	there	feels	that	the	criteria	their	state	has	to	
meet	before	becoming	a	member	do	not	take	their	particular	social	and	economic	condi-
tions	into	account.	One	of	the	problems	is	the	obligation	to	cooperate	with	the	International	
Criminal	Tribunal	 for	 the	 former	Yugoslavia	 (ICTY),	which	 forces	 the	 state	 to	 submit	 for	
trial	people	who	are	regarded	as	national	heroes	by	a	large	part	of	Croatian	society.	Most	
Croatians	consider	their	nation	to	be	a	vic-
tim	of	the	war,	and	therefore	believe	that	
their	compatriots	should	not	be	held	crim-
inally	liable	for	actions	that	resulted	from	
an	absolute	necessity,	namely	the	need	to	
defend	the	country.	Also,	due	to	extensive	
state	aid	for	the	industry	and	agriculture	in	
Croatia,	access	to	European	Union	funds	
is	not	–	according	to	public	opinion	–	likely	
to	compensate	for	the	profits	and	privileges	lost	in	such	sectors	as	agriculture,	the	ship-
building	 and	 steel	 industries.	 The	necessity	 to	 adapt	 to	 the	EU’s	 competition	 principles	
may	 trigger	 the	 collapse	 of	 entire	 sectors	 of	 the	 country’s	 economy.	Distrust	 of	 the	 EU	
also	results	from	Croatia's	long-standing	dispute	with	Slovenia:	the	latter	had	blocked	the	
former’s	accession	negotiations,	and	thus	forced	Croatia	to	sign	an	arbitration	agreement	
that	resolved	a	border	dispute	between	the	two	countries.	The	previous	governments	led	
by	Ivo	Sanader	and	Ivica	Račan	are	also	responsible	for	the	public	attitude	towards	the	EU:	
while	 implementing	 the	 reforms	 that	 caused	 public	 protest,	 these	 governments	 justified	
themselves	with	the	obligation	to	adapt	Croatian	legislation	to	EU	standards.
The	high	 level	of	Euroscepticism	also	stems	 from	social	distrust	of	 the	national	political	
elite	and	successive	governments7	who	have	been	unable	to	handle	the	accumulating	social	
problems.	Reluctance	to	join	the	EU	can	be	interpreted	as	a	vote	of	no	confidence	in	the	po-
litical	elites	who	support	integration	regardless	of	its	social	consequences.	The	referendum	
is	scheduled	to	take	place	before	the	elections,	so	it	cannot	be	ruled	out	that	the	public	will	
use	it	to	manifest	its	objections	to	the	ruling	party.
Even though all important political 
groups and elites favour Croatia's 
membership in the EU, public opinion 
polls show that a considerable part 
of society has long been opposed to 
their country's membership in the EU.
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8	 Por.	Croatia:	Behind	a	wall	
of	silence:	Prosecution	of	war	
crimes	in	Croatia,	
http://www.amnesty.eu/con-
tent/assets/Doc2010/Croatia_
BehindWallofSilence.pdf
Preparations for the accession and negotiations
After	Jadranka	Kosor	took	office	as	Prime	Minister	 in	July	2009,	the	accession	negotia-
tions	accelerated	significantly.	Thanks	to	Kosor,	an	agreement	was	signed	with	Slovenia,	
which	had	been	blocking	progress	in	the	accession	negotiations	for	over	a	year	because	
of	a	border	dispute.	At	the	same	time,	the	government	has	initiated	reform	of	the	judici-
ary,	intensified	the	fight	against	corruption,	and	prepared	the	plan	for	a	restructuring	of	the	
shipbuilding	industry.
For	the	moment,	Croatia	has	provisionally	closed	28	out	of	the	35	negotiation	chapters.	
However,	the	remaining	7	chapters	include	the	areas	which	are	most	problematic	for	
Zagreb,	such	as	fisheries,	agriculture,	the	judiciary	and	fundamental	rights,	and	the	com-
petition	 policy.	 According	 to	 the	 report	
published	 by	 the	 European	 Commission	
in	November	2010	assessing	the	state	of	
Croatia's	preparations	for	EU	membership	
(legal	status	as	of	September	2010),	sig-
nificant	 progress	was	noted	 in	 all	 areas,	
but	 it	was	yet	 considered	 insufficient	 for	
completing	the	accession	negotiations.
In	the	area	of	the	judiciary	and	fundamen-
tal	rights,	legal	solutions	were	adopted	to	
strengthen	 the	 independence	 of	 judges	
and	improve	their	qualifications.	However,	it	is	hard	to	predict	whether	and	how	the	new	
regulations	will	be	implemented	in	practice.	Even	though	the	effectiveness	of	the	judiciary	
has	been	improved,	trials	still	tend	to	be	protracted.	There	has	been	improvement	in	the	
area	of	human	rights,	although	problems	remain	when	it	comes	to	respecting	the	rights	of	
national	and	ethnic	minorities.	Great	importance	is	also	attached	to	the	effectiveness	of	the	
government's	fight	against	corruption	and	organised	crime.
Other	issues	important	for	concluding	the	negotiations	in	this	chapter	include	the	follow-
ing	matters:	Croatia's	 resolution	of	 its	war	 legacy,	 i.e.	 judging	war	crimes	committed	by	
Croatian	 nationals,	 respecting	minority	 rights,	 and	 the	 return	 of	 refugees.	 For	 some	EU	
member	states	(the	Netherlands,	Belgium,	and	Denmark)	the	report	by	Serge	Brammertz,	
the	 prosecutor	 of	 the	 International	 Criminal	 Tribunal	 for	 the	 former	 Yugoslavia	 (ICTY),	
due	 to	 be	 published	 in	mid-June	 2011,	will	 be	 of	 critical	 importance.	 So	 far,	 Croatia's	
cooperation	with	the	Tribunal	has	been	regarded	as	unsatisfactory,	as	Croatia	has	failed	
to	provide	documents	for	the	trial	of	several	Croatian	army	generals.	On	the	other	hand,	
the	fact	that	the	trial	has	been	concluded	is	to	Zagreb's	advantage.	As	the	accession	ne-
gotiations	come	to	an	end,	as	does	the	activity	of	the	Tribunal,	some	NGOs	have	tried	to	
expose	the	lack	of	political	will	to	account	in	national	courts	for	the	war	crimes	commit-
ted	by	Croatians8.	Organisations	such	as	Amnesty	International	and	Human	Rights	Watch	
have	tried	to	put	pressure	on	EU	member	states	and	institutions,	so	that	these	issues	are	
considered	while	assessing	Croatia's	readiness	for	accession.	If	their	efforts	are	successful,	
the	completion	of	the	negotiations	may	be	delayed.	
In	the	area	of	competition	policy,	the	government’s	main	task	is	to	restructure	the	shipbuild-
ing	and	steel	industries,	which	are	sustained	thanks	to	substantial	state	aid.	Shipyards	pro-
vide	a	large	number	of	jobs	(there	are	around	12,000	shipyards	employees,	and	a	further	
35,000	are	employed	in	affiliated	enterprises),	and	account	for	15%	of	Croatia’s	exports.	
Several	unsuccessful	attempts	have	been	made	to	privatise	the	shipyards.	Since	unemploy-
ment	has	already	 increased	significantly,	 the	Croatian	government	will	avoid	making	any	
decisions	 that	would	 lead	 to	mass	 redundancies	 in	 this	 sector.	To	 this	 end,	Zagreb	has	
After Jadranka Kosor took office 
as Prime Minister in July 2009, 
the accession negotiations accelerated 
significantly. The government has 
initiated reform of the judiciary, 
intensified the fight against corruption, 
and prepared the plan for a restructur-
ing of the shipbuilding industry.
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9	 Even	Germany,	which	is	scep-
tical	about	further	EU	
enlargement,	does	not	ques-
tion	Croatia's	prompt	acces-
sion	to	the	EU.
10	 http://www.europarl.europa.
eu/pl/pressroom/content/	
20110124IPR12358/html/
Croatia-EU-enlargement-front-
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presented	the	European	Commission	with	a	new	plan	for	restructuring	the	shipyards	which	
states	that	they	should	remain	state-owned.	The	government	has	drawn	attention	to	the	
economic	crisis,	and	is	hoping	that	the	EU	will	relax	its	position	on	this	issue,	and	allows	
state	aid	for	the	shipbuilding	industry	to	be	continued.	In	agriculture,	Croatia	has	applied	for	
a	record	number	of	exclusions	and	adjustment	periods	(29).	The	government	is	not	ready	to	
make	any	concessions	in	these	negotiations,	as	farmers	are	the	HDZ's	traditional	electorate,	
and	are	often	unfavourably	disposed	towards	the	EU.	A	similar	attitude	can	also	be	noted	
in	the	negotiations	concerning	the	fishing	industry.
The	European	Commission	has	also	voiced	its	doubts	concerning	the	quality	of	the	Croatian	
state	administration.	This	is	a	matter	of	great	importance	for	the	EU	in	the	context	of	imple-
menting	and	applying	the	EU	legislation	and	meeting	the	membership	requirements.	The	EU	
has	highlighted	overstaffing,	incompetence,	and	the	overly	complex	and	fragmented	structure	
of	central	and	local	government.	A	fundamental	reform	of	this	system	would	produce	serious	
public	resistance	in	regional	centres,	and	would	require	layoffs.	In	a	period	of	record	unem-
ployment	levels	in	Croatia,	the	government	will	probably	avoid	this	kind	of	decision.
The EU policy
The	attitude	of	the	EU	member	states	will	be	crucial	in	completing	the	accession	negotia-
tions.	Despite	growing	 'enlargement	 fatigue',	Croatian	accession	seems	 to	be	a	 foregone	
conclusion9.	The	decision	to	complete	the	accession	negotiations	in	the	first	half	of	this	year	
is	supported	by	Hungary	(which	holds	the	presidency	in	the	EU	Council)	and	most	of	the	
member	states	(including	Germany,	Italy	and	Austria).	The	EU	institutions,	 including	the	
European	 Parliament10,	 are	 also	 working	
to	complete	these	talks.	
Bearing	 in	mind	 the	 negative	 experience	
with	Bulgaria	and	Romania,	the	member	
states	are	paying	special	attention	to	the	
effective	 fight	against	corruption	and	 the	
independence	 of	 the	 judiciary.	 Paradoxi-
cally,	the	arrests	of	former	government	of-
ficials	(including	the	spectacular	detention	of	Ivo	Sanader),	which	were	supposed	to	prove	
the	cabinet's	will	to	combat	corruption	at	the	highest	level,	have	actually	marred	Croatia's	
reputation	on	the	international	stage	and	within	the	EU.	One	sign	of	this	was	the	numerous	
amendments	proposed	to	the	resolution	concerning	Croatia	which	have	been	prepared	by	
the	European	Parliament,	most	of	them	concerning	the	fight	against	corruption	(it	was	em-
phasised	that	corruption	is	widespread	in	Croatia,	and	deeply	affects	its	system	of	govern-
ment).	The	consolidation	of	this	image	may	impede	Croatia's	accession	process.
The	completion	of	negotiations	may	be	delayed	if	the	EU	chooses	to	wait	for	the	Croatian	
governments'	 efforts	 to	 bring	 about	 tangible	 results.	However,	 it	 is	 not	 the	 only	 option,	
as	the	member	states	will	still	be	able	to	influence	Croatia's	domestic	situation	even	after	
completing	the	negotiations,	by	making	the	ratification	of	the	accession	treaty	dependent	
on	solving	this	country's	crucial	problems.	Moreover,	about	two	years	will	elapse	from	the	
completion	of	negotiations	to	full	accession,	a	period	which	can	be	used	for	full	adjustment	
to	the	EU	requirements.	The	EU	has	also	developed	a	Cooperation	and	Verification	Mecha-
nism	under	which	Romania	and	Bulgaria	were	placed.	 If	 the	member	states	have	some	
reservations,	this	mechanism	could	also	be	applied	to	Croatia.
Another	 issue	that	may	affect	 the	negotiation	process	 is	 that	of	appending	amendments	
to	the	Lisbon	Treaty	to	the	accession	treaty.	If	there	is	a	chance	that	these	amendments	
will	be	negotiated	and	adopted	by	autumn	2011,	the	EU	states	are	likely	to	step	up	the	
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accession	negotiations	 and	 sign	 the	 treaty	with	Croatia.	An	 important	 argument	 for	 the	
government	in	Zagreb	is	the	weak	public	support	for	EU	membership.	If	socially	sensitive	
reforms	are	implemented,	this	support	could	decrease	even	further,	and	result	in	the	rejec-
tion	of	EU	membership	in	the	referendum.	This	would	adversely	affect	the	EU’s	image,	and	
would	have	a	negative	impact	on	the	effectiveness	of	EU	policy	towards	the	Balkan	states	
which	are	closely	watching	the	process	of	Croatia's	accession	to	the	EU.	These	countries	
are	already	weary	of	the	ongoing	reform	process,	which	has	not	brought	any	tangible	results	
and	has	not	brought	the	prospect	of	membership	significantly	closer.	If	Croatia	rejected	EU	
membership	in	a	referendum,	this	would	reinforce	the	remaining	Balkan	states'	concerns	
that	the	accession	process	requires	such	a	great	effort	of	reform	that	it	is	ultimately	not	
worth	it.	A	similar	effect	could	be	produced	by	further	delays	in	negotiations	with	Croatia.
Prospects
For	Prime	Minister	 Jadranka	Kosor,	her	 government	and	 the	HDZ	party,	 the	completion	
of	accession	negotiations	 in	 the	 first	half	of	 the	year	 is	 the	 last	chance	 to	 improve	 their	
poll	ratings	and	prevent	defeat	in	the	parliamentary	elections.	PM	Kosor	will	focus	on	im-
plementing	the	judiciary	reform	and	stepping	up	the	anti-corruption	campaign.	However,	
in	other	problematic	areas	(the	shipbuilding	and	steel	industries,	agriculture,	fisheries,	state	
administration)	the	government	is	counting	on	the	EU's	flexibility,	which	would	allow	Croatia	
to	successfully	complete	the	negotiations.	If	they	are	not	completed	under	Hungary's	presi-
dency,	 their	completion	 in	 the	second	half	of	 the	year	may	be	much	more	difficult,	due	
to	the	EU’s	own	internal	schedule	(negotiations	on	a	new	financial	perspective	are	to	be	
launched),	and	the	upcoming	parliamentary	elections	in	Croatia	itself.	Moreover,	the	two	
states	who	will	 hold	 the	 presidency	 in	 the	 EU	Council	 in	 2012,	Denmark	 and	 Cyprus,	
are	sceptical	of	Croatia's	membership	 in	 the	EU,	and	 towards	 the	policy	of	enlargement	
in	general.	This	could	cause	a	significant	delay	of	the	accession	negotiations,	and	postpone	
Croatia's	membership.
Since	decisions	concerning	the	accession	of	new	states	are	taken	unanimously,	it	cannot	
be	ruled	out	 that	some	member	states	will	decide	 to	block	 the	completion	of	accession	
talks	for	individual	reasons.	However,	if	the	internal	situation	in	Croatia	remains	unchanged,	
the	completion	of	accession	negotiations	in	the	first	half	of	the	year	seems	very	likely.
